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Nobody's Grandfather 
Was a Merchant: 
Understanding the Soviet 
Connnercial Negotiation 
Process and Style 
Mahesh N. Raj an John L. Graham 
I
t looked strange indeed. There were two Americans with their 
sleeves rolled up bargaining with three Japanese sitting stiffly, 
and the conversation was dubbed into Russian. Instead ofyes 
or hai, it was da and so on. The videotapes were part of two-day 
seminars the second author was delivering to groups ofSoviet 
enterprise managers in Moscow in 1989. The programs had two goals. The 
first was to learn about Soviet negotiation styles by directly observing 
Soviet behavior in simulated commercial negotiations. The second goal 
was to help familiarize the Soviets with the American and Japanese negoti­
ation styles , since both groups are important investors in the evolving 
Soviet market system . Our research and experiences in Moscow confirm 
that American managers dealing with Soviets today and in the future will 
need what Tolstoy referred to as: "The strongest of all warriors ... time 
and patience ." ' 
Background 
Hardly a day passes without some mention in the popular media of the 
dramatic changes taking place in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 
Though much uncertainty surrounds his own future , Mikhail Gorbachev's 
campaigns of perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness) have 
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greatly transformed the nature and core of global politics . Consequentially, 
the world has witnessed such radical events as the tearing down of the 
Berlin Wall and the reunification of the two Germanies , freely elected non­
communist governments in Poland and Czechoslovakia , the bloody over­
throw and execution of Rumania's hard-line dictator, and the di sbanding of 
Bulgaria 's once highly feared secret police . 
Speculation is no longer necessary about whether these changes mark 
the beginning of an irreversible process. These changes signal a shift in 
ideology and also herald economic opportunities for American and Western 
firms in hitherto closed , totalitarian nations. Dissension within COMECON , 
the 40-year-old system which once controlled trade in Eastern bloc countries , 
has caused it to lose power and subsequently has sent member countries 
scurrying to find new sources of capital and technology. Of these countries , 
the Soviet Union , because of its geographic and economic immensity, prob­
ably interests American firms the most as a potential market. 
Unfortunately, economic relations between the U .S. and the Soviet 
Union have been overshadowed and influenced by their political discourses . 
Clearly, the U.S. government 's historical practice of ad hoc trade policies 
to either help or harm the Soviets (depending on the current U.S. perspective) 
is a well-documented testimony to this. In the last few decades , this unfor­
tunate condition is reflected in the fact that there is far more English language 
literature dealing with formal state-to-state negotiations between the Soviet 
Union and the U.S . than there is on commercial trade negotiations between 
the two. Corporate America suffers from a paucity of knowledge about 
Soviet culture and the logic of Soviet negotiation processes , coupled with a 
general suspicion and skepticism of the Soviets rooted in the heightened 
political conflicts of the past seventy years. Ideologically driven by stereo­
typical images of their counterparts , American business executives generally 
find negotiations with the Soviets tedious and cumbersome , and such nega­
tive experiences further fuel fallacious thoughts and actions . Given the 
ideological differences between the U.S. and the Soviets , as well as the 
fragile existence of economic trade between the two , it is not surprising 
that Americans lag behind Europeans and Japanese in venturing into business 
in the Soviet Union. As their respective views shift to be less confrontational , 
however, new opportunities for cooperation may emerge. Frustrations may 
be lowered , business endeavors facilitated , and economic ties strengthened 
as both sides gain insights into one another's cultures and the logic of their 
negotiation styles. 
Our own studies investigated similarities and , more importantly, differ­
ences in the processes and outcomes of negotiations in the U.S . and the 
Soviet Union. For instance , in both cultures a cooperative and interpersonal 
approach tended to lead to higher satisfaction for the partners-a critical 
factor for establishing long-term business relationships. However, a 
problem-solving approach yielded higher profits for individual negotiators 
among the Americans , but a similar approach among the Soviets re sulted 
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in lower profits. Thus, the cooperative approach may yield positive results 
when used by Americans in negotiations with their fellow countrymen , but 
it may not work in the same way with Soviet negotiators. Conversely, a 
competitive or distributive approach which tends to work among Soviets 
may not achieve comparable results with American business executives. 
Based on our most recent studies, these differences appear to be crucial 
and fundamental, hence they must be acknowledged and examined to 
develop normative models of negotiations for the two countries. For negoti­
ations to be successful , both sides must be cognizant and sensitive to how 
their differences can precipitate problems. 
A point of caution-the kind of Soviet negotiator you will be sitting 
across from may be quite different from even last year. Until recently, only 
officials from Foreign Trade Organizations (FfOs) participated in commer­
cial negotiations with Western firms. Though representatives and managers 
of Soviet state enterprises were allowed to be present at such meetings, 
foreign trade (i.e . , imports and exports) was under the exclusive control of 
the few dozen FfOs. However, since April 1988, more than 5 ,000 Soviet 
state enterprises have applied for direct trading rights-meaning Western 
managers can now call on Soviet buyers and sellers directly, thus avoiding 
the previous bureaucratic channels. Additionally, provinces such as Russia 
and Lithuania are threatening to conduct trade autonomously and outside of 
the Union of the Soviet Republic. 
Moreover, most of the previous literature on the Soviet negotiation style 
is based upon observation of political negotiators and to a lesser extent FrO 
personnel. However, several scholars have suggested that very basic driving 
forces influence traits and behaviors of Soviet negotiators across all negoti­
ation situations-commercial, political and arms reduction talks. 2 This 
point is best articulated by Beliaev, Mullen , and Punnett , who state: 
All individual or collective action s of Soviet neg otiators are overwhelmingl y influenced 
by the state and the state ideology. The emphasis on individual behavior, which is 
culturally " in the blood" of Americans , leads to a tendency for them to underestimate 
the pervasiveness of the Soviet state in the con sciou sness and behavior of every Soviet 
person . It is necessary to realize that the Soviet people take virtually no step , in their 
public or private lives , which does not depend on the state . 3 
Therefore , in our discussion of the Soviet negotiation process and style , 
relevant material from the literature regarding arms and political negotia­
tions is also considered. 
Finally, though dramatic changes have been taking place in the structure 
of the Soviet economy, it certainly does not mean that the Soviet Union is 
on the verge of becoming a normal market economy. While commitment to 
the party or state ideology may be on the wane , we feel that it will be per­
haps generations before such fundamental values can be eradicated, if at 
all, from the culture and lifestyle of the Soviet people. Hence, institutional 
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controls (such as price-fixing) and non profit-ma.Ximizing goals will remain , 
thereby influencing Soviet and American negotiators to respond differently 
to economic stimuli. 
The Soviet Negotiation Process 
Lengthy-Negotiations involving Soviets can last for a few years before 
an agreement is reached. Indeed, McDonalds of Canada first started talking 
to the Soviets in 1976. The primary reason for long, drawn-out negotiations 
is that often they are divided into two sequential stages: technical and com­
mercial. The technical stage may or may not include the end-user and spans 
issues such as technical requirements, product specific;;ations, and tech­
nology considerations. Only after its successful completion , which can take 
a year, will the Soviets discuss the financial aspects of the deal. Then the 
commercial stage , often involving representatives from the Foreign Trade 
Organizations and from Soviet financial institutions , generally takes a like 
amount of time. There are other factors which also slow down the negotia­
tion process: overlapping and conflicting ministerial divisions , multiple 
layers of decision making , centralized planning , tenuous lines of internal 
communication, and intense specialization (which results in no one indi­
vidual having complete information or authority). Further, the Soviets may 
prolong the technical negotiation stage to acquire as much knowledge of 
Western technology as possible. Finally, they, like managers in most foreign 
countries, may also deliberately dally to gain concessions by taking advan­
tage of the renowned "eagerness" and " impatience" of the Americans . 
Alternatively, the Soviets can hasten negotiation processes when the object 
of the negotiations has a high priority to them or when they are the seller. 
Location-Connected closely with timing is location. And there's simply 
no ideal place to negotiate with a Soviet , at least from the standpoint of the 
typically impatient American. For example , we know of one American 
firm whose managers travelled to the south of France (a neutral location) to 
close negotiations with a Soviet customer on a multimillion-dollar natural 
gas pipeline equipment deal. The Soviets arrived and , true to their reputa­
tion , refused to budge on any provision. The American negotiation team 
was quite discouraged until it occurred to them that the Soviets weren ' t in a 
hurry for several reasons. Negotiation tactics , yes , but the Soviets were 
also simply enjoying their stay on the Mediterranean. So the Americans , 
with wary permission from their headquarters , decided to slow things down 
themselves. The two sides would meet at 10 a .m. , quickly decide that 
nothing could be resolved , then agree to meet the next morning at 10 a.m. 
Then both sides would hit the golf links or the beach or get some paperwork 
done. This routine went on for one, two , three weeks. Finally, in the fourth 
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week, the Soviet side began making substantial concessions. The Soviets 
were not in a position to return to Moscow without a signed contract after a 
month in southern France! 
So, if you bring the Soviets to the U.S. or to a neutral location, they'll 
take their time. However, negotiating in Moscow is also a bad option. At 
this writing, the living conditions for visiting foreign executives are among 
the worst in the world. Americans will be even more impatient than in other 
foreign cities because Soviet accommodations lack the "creature comforts" 
typically available at the local Hilton. Moreover, in Moscow, the dearth of 
secure communication facilities makes negotiation processes very difficult. 
Perhaps the tongue-in-cheek comment about Reykjavic being the ideal loca­
tion for a U.S ./Soviet summit has some truth in it-"Nobody enjoys visiting 
Iceland." 
Difficult-Characteristically, Americans and Soviets have different 
priorities and ideological orientations, making negotiations between them 
arduous. Americans primarily are concerned with bottom-line profits and 
personal gains, while Soviets are more apt to be driven by ideological goals 
and collective gain for their organizations. Many Soviets may be unfamiliar 
with Western management concepts and practices: "the word market has no 
equivalent in the Russian language"~ and "some Soviet managers are even 
hazy about the meaning of the word profit"5 [emphases added]. In fact, the 
chairman of the Central Council of Trade Unions in the Soviet Union states 
that the Soviet "people discuss the market without even knowing what it is. 
We know more about space research than we do market research."6 This 
knowledge gap tends to further aggravate American business executives. 
Moreover, the Soviets view negotiations as tests of potential suppliers and, 
hence, intentionally complicate and prolong them, believing that companies 
which survive such ordeals are likely to be better partners than firms which 
drop out of the talks. Finally, Americans often find the Soviets' insistence 
on favorable credit terms exasperating, which contributes to the overall 
difficulties of negotiations. 
Countertrade Issues-Issues of countertrade play such a significant role 
in the negotiation processes that they warrant separate mention. Non­
monetary compensation schemes are explored by the Soviets for all but the 
highest priority items. The countertrade arrangements they propose can 
range from simple barter to highly complex product buy-backs and three­
party switching agreements. In the wrap-up of negotiations, after agree­
ments have already been reached regarding such things as price, quantity, 
and time frames, the Soviets propose such countertrade. Besides being 
concerned with the inconvertibility of the ruble, the Soviets are driven by 
two other motives. First, countertrade allows them to conserve their much 
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treasured, relatively limited hard currency reserves . Second , but of more 
importance , it helps them penetrate foreign markets without having to 
develop marketing skills and with no outlay for distribution facilities. Thus 
it should not be surprising that Soviets prefer to deal with firms which are 
agreeable to countertrade transactions. They probably assume that direct 
exporting will become easier once world markets become accustomed to 
Soviet products. If the opposite party insists on a cash-only method of pay­
ment and if there are no alternative suppliers or forms of agreement, the 
Soviets still introduce countertrade proposals as bargaining tools to gain 
additional concessions. 
Generalized Warranties and Written Contracts-Soviet buyers attempt 
to get the most generalized warranty agreement possible from the seller. 
Hence , they downplay American concerns about liabilities arising from 
non-specific warranties and unforeseen contingencies such as Act of God 
(force majeure) provisions. However, they have been known to hold the 
other party responsible for delays or failures even when the factors for non­
compliance were beyond that party 's control. Business executives who do 
not specifically spell out in writing the terms of responsibility and liability 
in the warranty section of their agreements will be rudely awakened by how 
boldly the Soviets attempt to exploit the vagueness of the agreement. All 
contracts between American firms and Soviets are generally governed by 
Soviet law, which does not recognize oral agreements as binding , so busi­
ness deals are not consummated until all concerned parties have signed the 
documents. Written contracts then supersede all previous unwritten agree­
ments and implicit assumptions , which explains why Soviet negotiators 
introduce countertrade issues so late in the process. Further, the Soviets 
insist on writing down every other aspect of the transaction-things taken 
for granted in Western nations such as verbal confirmations of receipt of 
goods and telephone reorders-except the warranty section. 
Peculiar Twists-When negotiations have been conducted in the Soviet 
Union , they have been marked by Soviet acts which Americans have generally 
found both unusual and disconcerting , to say the least: long-scheduled 
meetings were cancelled; agenda and venue were changed frequently; large 
orders were mentioned casually and just as casually denied; negotiation 
leaders were switched without informing the Americans. Americans who 
have dealt with the Soviets are divided on whether such Soviet actions are 
deliberate and hence unfair tactics , or if such developments are system­
related and therefore not only inevitable , but also legitimate. This issue 
continues to be a controversial debate as neither claim has been definitively 
proved. It behooves U .S. business executives , however, to be alert to and 
prepared for such peculiar developments . 
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Protocol/Symbolism-Soviets are so sensitive to protocol issues that, in 
addition to preferring that concerned parties deal directly rather than 
through intermediaries, they usually appoint negotiators comparable in 
position to the other party's representatives. They seem to gauge a firm's 
sincerity about doing business with them by the rank and status of the firm's 
negotiator and interpret simple acts (such as frequent trips to the Soviet 
Union by top executives, the opening of offices in the Soviet Union , and 
participation in trade fairs and exhibits in or sponsored by the Soviet Union) 
as symbolic representations of friendship and as acknowledgement of the 
worthiness of the Soviet market. Rival bidders have found that the firm 
which spends the most time, effort, and money wooing the Soviets often 
emerges from negotiations with the written contract. 
Continuity-Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the negotiation 
process is the Soviets' perspective of continuity. Because they prefer to do 
business with those with whom they have satisfactorily interacted in the 
past, the Soviet negotiators pay extra attention to a firm's reputation and 
capabilities during the first encounter. Successful initial contracts may pave 
the way for even more profitable future ventures as the Soviets become 
more cooperative and trusting of their foreign business partners and eventually 
voluntarily mitigate some of the hazards their partners find so thwarting. 
The Soviet Negotiation Style 
Secretive-Perhaps Winston Churchill put it best: "I cannot forecast to 
you the action of Russia. It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an 
enigma."7 The Soviet penchant for secrecy becomes apparent immediately 
to negotiators from other cultures , especially from Western nations. Isolation 
from and distrust of the rest of the world generally lead the Soviets to reveal 
very little information about themselves or their motives to outsiders. From 
an organizational and administrative perspective, in a bureaucratic monolith 
such as the Soviet Union, officials become tight-lipped because information 
is a source of power and upward mobility and is guarded jealously. 
Risk-Averse-Soviet negotiators' fears of being reprimanded and/or 
removed from privileged positions for unsuccessful and unfavorable contracts 
force them to have a basically conservative outlook and behavior. Moreover, 
the fundamentally deterministic nature of the (still largely) centralized plan­
ning system of the Soviet Union , with its history of ideological blindness 
to capitalistic management theories , encourages Soviet negotiators to be 
extremely wary of overstepping official bounds in their interactions with 
Western managers . 
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Detail-Oriented-The complexity of the Soviet bureaucracy, combined 
with the Soviets' risk-averse nature, forces their negotiators to pay great 
attention to even trivial and extraneous detail s. Also , to win the approval of 
their superiors, Soviet negotiators must be sure that they have not over­
looked the minutest of details . In fact, it is said that such attention to detail 
is expected from Soviet negotiators as evidence of their integrity and com­
mitment to the socialist ideology. Therefore , on several occasions Soviet 
negotiators have been known to expend a great deal of time and effort 
negotiating the picayune details in the "fine print" of contracts after gener­
ally agreeing to ventures worth millions of dollars. 
Unsympathetic-The Soviets are known to interpret the terms of a con­
tract literally and will brook no excuses from the other side for delays or 
failures to meet contractual obligations. There have been a few instances in 
the past when American firms have been penalized by the Soviets for non­
performance even though the factors causing non-compliance were directly 
controlled by the Soviets. American business executives should make sure 
that they take nothing for granted and that all conditions which determine 
the fulfillment of their obligations are specified in writing. Though they are 
irritated by the Soviet negotiators' dogged attention to detail , seldom do 
American business executives realize that their own interests are protected 
and enhanced by the highly detailed agreements that result from such 
negotiations . 
Uncompromising-Perhaps the most conspicuous aspect of Soviet 
negotiators at the bargaining table is their uncompromising attitude. 
Scholars as well as American business executives have frequently described 
them as tough, hard , confrontational , inflexible , competitive , stubborn , 
and rigid . Their behavior is said to reflect either the rigidity of their organ­
izational structures , their ideologies , their culture, or some combination of 
the three . 
Economic plans drawn up by the upper echelons of Soviet bureaucracy 
generally leave little authority or room for Soviet representatives , who are 
usually from the lower and middle levels of the organization , to maneuver 
at the negotiation table . 
From an ideological standpoint, the Soviets view the negotiation process 
as neither a means of achieving higher profits for their organization nor as 
a vehicle for furthering personal goals-unlike Americans. Instead , to the 
Soviets the negotiation process represents an opportunity for "right " (their 
world view) to succeed over "wrong" (the American perspective) ; thus they 
assume inflexible , uncompromising , conflictual stances . 
According to two experts on the Soviet Union , Vladimir and Victorina 
Lefebvre , Americans and Soviets are governed culturally by two different 
48 CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT 
"ethical systems."8 Western cultures are dominated by an ethical system in 
which the behavior of individuals who seek compromises to resolve con­
flicts with their adversaries is considered positive. However, Soviets are 
governed by a different ethical system in which it is positive for individuals 
to create new conflicts with adversaries and to exacerbate existing ones. 
The Lefebvres further contend that the very word "deal" itself has negative 
associations in the Russian language , because anyone seeking compromises 
is considered cowardly, weak, and unworthy. After observing the interactions 
of Soviet schoolchildren with Western tourists near the Kremlin, Professor 
Weigand commented that "a single stick of Juicy Fruit will get a foreigner a 
small piece of colored ribbon, but a whole package-after some tough bar­
gaining-can win a bronze-like medal of Marx and Lenin."9 His observation 
of children seems to corroborate the Lefebvres' theory that such rigidity on 
the part of the Soviet negotiators in their interaction with outsiders may be 
a product of the Soviet culture and thus may actually be a national trait , 
rather than due solely to bureaucratic and ideological forces . 
Indeed , based upon our own studies of the Soviet negotiation style, they 
seem to by nature take a much different approach to commercial negotia­
tions. Perhaps Alexander Arefiev, CEO of INFORCOM (an important 
Soviet management development firm) , puts it best: " My biggest problem 
is convincing my Soviet clients to take a cooperative approach with West­
erners." That is, by nature , Soviet executives will take a competitive or 
adversarial approach in negotiations with American s . Creative , win-win 
solutions don't fit the Soviet psyche well. So cooperation and commitment 
to open and honest information exchange must be imbued. 
Professor Oleg Vihansky, head of Moscow State University's Department 
of Management , provides a deeper cultural explanation when he contrasts 
the Soviets ' approach to business partnerships with that of the Japanese. 
He suggests that the Japanese are the best at searching for creative bargaining 
solutions-making the pie bigger before it is divided. Traditionally, Soviets 
see negotiations as more a zero-sum activity-they tend to worry about 
how the pie is to be divided with little thought to increasing its size. Rooted 
deep in the Soviet psyche is the idea that one person 's success is always at 
the expense of someone else. 
One aspect of our studies of negotiation styles around the world directly 
supports Professor Vihansky 's analysis. Not only have Americans and 
Soviets participated in our negotiation simulations, so have almost 800 
businesspeople from twelve other cultures. (Of course , materials were 
translated in each case and bargainers used their own native languages.) 
The simulation allows for creative bargaining solutions-it is not a zero­
sum game ; the "pie" can be made bigger via cooperative negotiation strate­
gies. As Vihansky would predict, the Japanese have been the best of all the 
cultural groups at making the pie big , that is , at maximizing joint profits. 
The bargaining solutions achieved by the Americans were near the average 
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for all fourteen groups . The Soviet outcomes were quite close to the bottom , 
a finding which confirms and clarifies the picture that Soviets are , by 
nature, uncompromising. 
Finally, we mentioned in an earlier section that Soviet managers are 
"hazy about the meaning of the word profit." The Soviet word priby l 
(meaning "for profits" ) implies exploitation; that is , profits are always at 
someone else's expense. Alternatively, the English term profits can imply 
exploitation but also often implies creativity. Indeed , this difference between 
the two languages in meanings of the term profits is a reflection of the more 
fundamental differences in the two social and commercial systems . When 
you say " profits," your Soviet counterpart thinks "exploitation ," not 
"creativity." 
Manipulative-As most commercial negotiations with Soviets take place 
in the Soviet Union, the Soviets can and do manipulate negotiation processes 
in order to gain better terms for themselves. Three of the more popular 
techniques employed by the Soviets as tools of bargaining leverage are 
described as follows: 
• 	 They will negotiate the price at the initial stages of the process under the 
pretext of placing a large order. Once they have wrangled the best possible 
price from the suppliers, the Soviets will then , in addition to bringing up 
countertrade demands , require either additional concessions (s uch as 
service contracts or personnel training programs) or will reduce the 
volume of their purchases while demanding the previously agreed upon 
pnce. 
• 	 "Whipsawing" is another favorite manipulative technique of the Soviets , 
wherein they carry on negotiations with several competing firms simul­
taneously. They then use selective information from their interaction with 
one firm in their negotiations with another, pitting the rival firms against 
each other, thus obtaining the most self-serving contract. On occasion , 
in not-too-subtle demonstrations of their relatively superior bargaining 
position, the Soviets have made arrangements for executives from rival 
firms to stay at the same hotel at the same time . 
• 	 An unknown Soviet bureaucrat will enter the room during actual negotia­
tions and fly into a rage at the other side for treating the Sov iet 
negotiators with disrespect and distrust. Expecting the American 
negotiators to be unnerved by this "tirade ," the Soviets will then indicate 
a willingness to forgive the Americans in exchange for additional 
concessiOns. 
While many American business executives would consider such acts by 
the Soviets unethical and unprofessional , these techniques may appear per­
fectly rational and legitimate in the eyes of the Soviets .10 Given that different 
"ethical systems" govern the two cultures, such a difference of opinion 
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should be regarded as neither surprising nor unusual. Based on their empir­
ical study of Soviet emigrants ' and middle-class Americans' responses to 
several hypothetical situations, the Lefebvres concluded that while "the 
majority of former Soviet citizens consider it acceptable to use bad means 
to achieve good goals ... the majority of Americans disagree with this." 11 
Our own more recent comparisons of American and Soviet managers' 
attitudes strongly confirm the Lefebvres ' findings . 
Loyal-Though most of the previously discussed material presents the 
Soviets in an adversarial and combative light, the authors certainly do not 
mean to imply nor to advocate that American firms should avoid the Soviet 
market. The Soviet Union is a highly desirable and potentially profitable 
market , as has been proven by the experiences of firms such as Occidental 
Petroleum and Pepsico. However, the development and nurturing of per­
sonal relationships with the Soviet negotiators are critical prerequisites to 
establishing good business relationships with the Soviets. The Soviet 
emphasis on interpersonal relationships and its effect on the outcome of 
negotiation s is perhaps rivalled by only a few cultures, if any. Organizational 
constraints , ideologically driven fear and suspicion of outsiders (especially 
of Americans) , and a fundamentally risk-averse nature make it absolutely 
imperative for the Soviet negotiators to sign contracts only with firms (and 
executives) they feel they can depend upon. Personal relationships based on 
mutual respect and understanding , combined with a history of satisfactory 
business transactions , are crucial for successful ventures with the Soviets . 
Efforts on the part of the American executives to acknowledge and gratify 
these requisites are rewarded with trust and loyalty by the Soviets, thereby 
perpetuating the Soviet preference for "continuity" in their commercial 
transactions with foreign firms . 
Reliable-Given the overall difficulty and frustrating nature of the Soviet 
negotiation process and style, a surprising characteristic of the Soviets is 
that until 1990 they were extremely reliable and always honored their con­
tractual commitments. Even more impressive was the impeccable record 
that the Soviets have had, until now, in fulfilling their financial obligations, 
to the extent that some American suppliers wish their Western customers 
were equally prompt and conscientious in their payments. Last year in 
Moscow, John Minneman , Chase Manhattan's vice president/representative 
in the USSR , told us about his Soviet banking counterparts: "They're 
sophisticated and tough , but they never lie and always pay on time." An 
observation by another expert on international trade succinctly sums up the 
nature of the Soviet negotiation process and style: ' /\lthough the Soviets 
drive a very hard bargain in contract negotiations , they will abide faithfully 
by its provisions , and expect the other party to do the same. They have an 
excellent record in honoring their financial commitments ." 12 
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However, the picture of the Soviets as reliable fiscally has become some­
what clouded in recent months. Several Western concerns have reported 
slow payments by Soviet customers. State-backed transactions at this point 
are not the problem , but some Soviet enterprise and foreign trade organiza­
tions (FfOs) are having trouble meeting current obligations and are not 
being bailed out by the Bank of Foreign Economic Affairs as was customary 
in the past. No one has yet defaulted , 13 but some American firms have 
stopped shipping to Soviet clients. In fact, most Western analysts blamed 
the problem on confusion caused by the reshuffling of Soviet officials as 
part of President Gorbachev 's perestroika and glasnost programs. However, 
one top-ranking Soviet official, addressing a symposium in the United 
States , allayed Western concerns about the Soviets defaulting on their pay­
ments by stating that " we do pay our bills , and we don ' t rob from Peter to 
pay Paul." 14 Moreover, the Soviet Union has begun depositing large 
amounts of gold with Western banks as collateral for loans; and to help 
cover overdue bills abroad , it is also drawing on Moscow 's hard currency 
reserves and setting up an internal collection agency. 15 These corrective 
measures, taken by the Soviets to restore and protect their once excellent 
credit rating , should provide incentive and reas surance to foreign firm s 
seeking new or increased trade opportunities. However, Americans must 
clearly recognize that in the long run , as free enterprise comes to the 
USSR , so will concomitant business failures and defaults. 
Some Tips for American Managers 
In interacting with the Soviets, besides profiting by a general awareness of 
the culture and the complex bureaucratic governance structure of the Soviet 
Union and their effects on the negotiations , American business executives 
may find it beneficial to adopt the following strategies . 
Be Cautious-While tremendous changes are taking place which represent 
a huge array of opportunities for American firms , the risk and uncertainty 
surrounding perestroika cannot be ignored nor trivialized. Mikhail 
Gorbachev is a charismatic leader who definitely has set the wheels of 
change in motion , but whether these reforms will last and lead to greater 
economic standards , only time will tell. Investing large amounts of capital 
and technology in a society governed by such a different ideological and 
political structure is perilous , as painfully illustrated in China last year. 
The fact that trade with socialist countries is subject to government inter­
vention based on the political climates, particularly of the U.S. , warrants a 
cautionary approach to the Soviet market. 
Be Open-Minded-American managers need to find ways to shed biases 
rooted in decades of selective and politically motivated information and 
52 CALIFORNIA MANAGEMENT n.r-vmvv ;:,pnng 1'::1'::11 
images of the Soviet Union. These images hinder objective evaluation of 
the viability of the Soviet market and make negotiations with the Soviets 
formidable. They also increase the chances of American firms losing out to 
more impartial competitors. In the long run, emphatically ruling out the 
viability of the Soviet market on the basis of ideological considerations 
may not be good business. Remember, the Soviets prefer dealing with long­
known business partners. 
There are no Dun and Bradstreet services for the Soviet Union. The only 
way to size up a potential partner is by relying on a network of acquain­
tances that you have established through a corporate presence in the coun­
try. You must take the time to learn the market and the people-there's just 
no quick way. 
Be Culturally Sensitive-Centuries of isolation and oppression have not 
only instilled a general fear and suspicion of outsiders, but also have forced 
the Soviets to rely solely on their cultural roots for the inner strength and 
ardor that typifies them. In spite of such onerous backgrounds , the Soviet 
people are an exceptionally proud and patriotic people. So much are they 
influenced by and committed to national and collective interests that they 
almost always relegate personal gain and welfare to a secondary status in 
their thoughts and behaviors. They appreciate and respect foreigners who 
are knowledgeable of and empathetic to their historical and cultural origins. 
Further, acquiring such knowledge not only helps American business 
executives understand Soviet citizens , but also helps them make the adjust­
ments necessary for successful business relationships with them. 
Unlike citizens in other countries, Soviets have no collective memory of 
free enterprise. In Eastern Europe and even the People's Republic of China 
and North Korea, young people have grandfathers who were merchants 
before World War II. Not so in the Soviet Union-the communist tradition 
goes back to 1917, so no Soviet's grandfather was a merchant. 
Be Patient-Any visitor to the Soviet Union , on business or as a tourist, 
immediately is aware of the incredible complexity and size of the Soviet 
bureaucracy. The assorted restrictions set by this monolithic and hierarchical 
administrative structure on Soviet negotiators force them to behave in ways 
that frustrate American executives. Additionally, current changes in the 
governance structure have removed the exclusivity of the well-trained and 
highly skilled FTO officials in dealings/negotiations with foreign corpora­
tions. Hence, state enterprise managers and middle-level officials who are 
unaware of Western management concepts have been thrust into negotiation 
settings, making these situations painful and slow for both parties. A key 
point for Westerners sitting at the table with Soviets to remember: Be both 
cognizant and patient with the traditional Soviet approach; "help" your 
partners learn to look for ways to make the commercial pie bigger for both 
sides-it's simply not their natural style. Even if the longevity and arduous­
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ness of the negotiations are of a deliberate nature , American executives 
can , by exhibiting atypical patience, pave the way not only in initial con­
tracts, but also in opening up future profitable opportunities . 
Exchange Views about Negotiation Processes-Caution is suggested 
here. One Soviet executive told us that what bothers him most about 
Americans is their arrogance. He said that ' 'Americans take a teaching 
approach" while "Japanese listen cordially." While it is true that Soviets 
are willing to learn directly about the American free enterprise system in 
management seminars , they may resent being " taught " by their business 
partners. In negotiations, we recommend an information exchange or 
mutual teaching approach. It is all right to say, "This is the way things work 
where I come from ," only if you've first asked how things work in the USSR. 
During your get-acquainted meetings or dinners , you may want to ask 
your counterpart how negotiations typically proceed in the Soviet Union . 
That is, you might verify the information we provide here about the Soviet 
negotiation style and process. Tell them this is what you have been reading 
about the Soviet approach, and then ask, "What do you think of Rajan and 
Graham's ideas?" 
Then you will be in a position to say things like , " In the West we try to 
be creative in business negotiations by exchanging information freely-we 
try to make the pie bigger before we cut it up ." Show an interest in their 
system and its transformations before you begin giving advice. And get 
these things straightened out before you begin your specific task-related 
discussions. 
Be Flexible-A rigid adherence to planned strategies and goals may not be 
the best negotiation stance for American firms in the Soviet Union. One 
area of negotiations where flexibility and a willingness to consider other 
options are particularly important is the area of credit and payment provis­
ions. Though American managers are indoctrinated by the free market and 
their corporate structural orientations to have a " hard-currency-transaction­
only" attitude, it is not profitable to apply this in negotiating with the Soviet 
Union. Professor Yoffie observed that " in a buyer 's market countertrade 
can be especially important. When price, technology, and quality are com­
parable, willingness to countertrade often separates winners from losers ." 16 
Therefore , American managers, if they wish to compete successfully for 
the Soviet market with Japanese and European competitors (who have 
accepted non-monetary compensation agreements somewhat more 
enthusiastically) , need to consider seriously the opportunities of trade 
without money. 
Hopefully, other American firms and their executives can learn something 
from the Pepsico example. Obviously, Pepsico Inc. is quite satisfied with 
its long-standing countertrade arrangements with the Soviets-Pepsi-Cola 
bartered for Stolichnaya Vodka and scrap iron from moth-balled Soviet 
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battleships. They have recently agreed to a dramatic expansion of their 
operations in the USSR , including continuing provisions for countertrade. 
Right now most American managers seem to suffer badly from what we 
call "allassophobia," or "fear of countertrade." 17 Recently, we had lunch 
with an executive of a local high-tech firm who was about to depart for the 
Soviet Union. We asked him how he planned to handle his Soviet cus­
tomer's probable countertrade proposals. His response was a classic display 
of acute allassophobia: "We won't do countertrade. Our company has a 
policy against it." Within ten days of our luncheon, a major competitor 
announced being awarded that very bid, and, of course, the deal included 
countertrade provisions. 
Allassophobia is a serious malady which impairs American firms not 
only in Soviet trade but also in world trade generally. Despite the fact that 
20 to 30 percent of world trade is financed via countertrade, American 
financial institutions ignore its key importance. Alan Shapiro reserved only 
three pages for a discussion of countertrade options in his very popular 
textbook on international finance. The number crunchers on Wall Street 
fear what they cannot easily measure, thus countertrade is ignored in text­
books and consequently eschewed in American board rooms. The key 
lesson here is that avoiding countertrade as a matter of corporate policy, as 
so many U.S. companies do, accomplishes nothing more than tying the 
hands of your negotiators. Certainly your Japanese and European com­
petitors do not suffer from allassophobia . 
Finally, countertrade may be another way to hedge against potential hard 
currency payment problems. Who can predict the availability of hard cur­
rency in the USSR? As we mentioned, recent signals suggest that the USSR 
may be reaching the limit of its currency reserves. Thus, countertrade deals 
should be examined and considered, because they may be the most attrac­
tive options in the future. 
Have a Long-Term Orientation-In any nation burdened with a stagnant 
or declining economy and lacking the internal capability to develop its own 
untapped potential, investments take a long period to come to fruition, if 
they mature at all. Though they are somewhat inappropriate , the character­
istically short -term concerns of corporate America may succeed to some 
extent in other countries with private sector industries. In a non-market 
economy like the Soviet Union, however, the probabilities of ventures with 
such orientations succeeding are rather infinitesimal. The Soviets (and the 
other Eastern European countries) desperately need and are looking for 
Western firms that are willing to invest in critical industries in their country, 
transfer much needed technology, train their labor force and managers , 
accept noncash and/or lower cash payments, and play an invaluable overall 
role in helping them reform and develop the Soviet economy. While initially 
these adjustments may be rather difficult, the subsequent goodwill of the 
Soviet people and favored access to the tremendous potential of the Soviet 
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market would be the rewards for American corporations that make the 
transition. 
West Germans and South Koreans, in addition to the Japanese , are taking 
the necessary long-term approach to the Soviet market. Consider the com­
ments of Alfred Herrhausen, former CEO of Germany 's biggest bank, 
regarding Deutsche Bank's investments in the USSR: "It will take at least 
two generations. One generation is necessary to be willing to introduce 
freedom, but it will take the next to figure out how to make economic use 
of its benefits." 18 Also , the fact that both West Germany and South Korea 
have either announced or are considering loans to the Soviet Union attests 
to the long-term orientations of these two countries. 19 Recently, Korea's 
Daewoo Motor Company gave a Soviet ministry fifty automobiles-a 
$250 ,000 or so investment towards future sales and goodwill. 
Moreover, while many Western firms have halted shipments to the Soviet 
Union in response to the unusual delays in payments, the Japanese have 
taken a different approach. Several major Japanese trading houses, while 
continuing deliveries to the Soviet Union, have submitted export insurance 
claim notices to their government. (According to some analysts, the 
Japanese companies' low profile on this problem is intentional as they don ' t 
want to harm future trade prospects.) "They're being cautious ," said Kazuko 
Motomura, an official with the Institute for Soviet and East European Eco­
nomic Studies (a research organization set up by traders who do business 
with Eastern Europe), "But they're also thinking about the promising pos­
sibilities of the market in the future." 20 
Nissho-Iwsai (a major trading company), despite notifying the Japanese 
government about delays in Soviet payments for its steel and chemical prod­
ucts, confirmed that it still intended to participate in a consortium that is 
involved in a 38 billion yen ($239.4 million) project to build three com­
pressor plants in the USSR. "We think that the Soviet Union will definitely 
make the payment ," said Tetsuya Ouishi , an official in Nissho-Iwsai 's public 
relations division. 2 1 
Finally, take a ride up the elevator at the World Trade Center (Sovin Center) 
in Moscow sometime . There you'll find offices of Chase Manhattan (17th 
floor) and Bank of America (16th floor), the latter with no executive perma­
nently in Moscow at this writing. But on the way up , the elevator will 
undoubtedly be crowded with Japanese in blue suits , a few of whom will 
exit at the Mitsubishi floor, then the Mitsui and Sumitomo floors , and so on . 
Conclusions 
The pace and nature of change in the Soviet Union is such that many 
American perceptions and opinions of the Soviets, and perhaps some of the 
contents of this article , have become and are becoming increasingly obso­
lete. While it certainly is not an exhaustive account, we hope the above 
discussion provides American business executives a general insight into the 
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Soviet negotiation process and style. If this article does nothing more than 
create an awareness among American managers of several key issues which 
contribute to the difficulties of negotiating with the Soviets and of appro­
priate and possible adaptations which may lead to many profitable ventures 
in the Soviet Union, we consider its purpose achieved. In spite of the many 
obstacles, economic trade will be enhanced if Americans gain a better 
understanding of the Soviet peoples' history and culture. Also, the ambas­
sadorial efforts of business leaders like Armand Hammer and James Giffen 
are indeed commendable and should be encouraged. Other events are 
encouraging: the formation of the American Trade Consortium by six major 
corporations (including Chevron and Kodak) and its signing of an agree­
ment with the Soviet Foreign Economic Consortium; the recent signing of 
a trade pact by officials from both countries which could lead to trade worth 
about $15 billion; and the passing of the "private property" law by the 
Soviet legislature in March 1990. Hopefully, these are milestones, not 
merely token symbolic representations, and depict the foundations of 
greater and more stable economic cooperation between these two great 
nations. In his address to the ninth annual meeting of the USSR Trade and 
Economic Council, President Gorbachev pointed out that "if we are to have 
genuinely stable and enduring relationships capable of ensuring a lasting 
peace, they should be based, among other things, on well-developed busi­
ness relations." 22 
Without exception, the Soviets and Americans we talked to emphasized 
the necessity in U.S. -Soviet trade for developing personal relationships, 
relationships which persist beyond political change and ideological differ­
ences. Indeed, such personal relationships can cause political change. If 
American business leaders wish to influence Soviet politics, they might­
instead of contributing to the political campaigns of favorite Republicans 
or Democrats in the U.S.-invest in business partnerships in the Soviet 
Union. Incentives for peace can best be created if Americans and Soviets 
understand one another on a personal basis. Indeed, Kipling's lines remain 
quite pertinent today: 
Oh, East is East, and West is West , and never the twain shall meet, 

'Til Earth and Sky stand presently at God 's great Judgment Seat ; 

But there is neither East nor West, border, nor breed, nor birth , 

When two strong men stand face to face , though they come from the ends of the earth! 23 
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